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Abstract: In this essay I will suggest Leo Marx’s debt to a style of thinking about 
technology which cuts against the grain of the liberal humanism and liberal progres-
sive ideology that informs his writing. This style of thinking, associated with the word 
technicity, underscores the intimacy of our relation to technology. The Machine in the 
Garden insists that technology is a crucial aspect of our human nature—it encourages 
us to see that nature is inseparable from our technological condition.  In this sense, 
the machine and the garden are confounded in Marx’s book. The book’s key themes 
and conflicts short-circuit the mission to promote the liberal individualist illusion of 
escape from the shaping forces of history. What we can begin to glean in The Machine 
in the Garden is that there is no place for a transcendence that guarantees the “natu-
ralness” of nature, or the romantic integrity of the self. There is only the world—an 
increasingly technologically mediated world—which on the one hand creates the very 
means for our access to nature, and on the other hand, dispels the very ‘Nature’ it re-
veals through an inevitable process of contamination across the nature/culture divide. 
Keywords: technicity, liberal consensus, posthumanism, ecological thought, Leo 
Marx
Leo Marx’s seminal book The Machine in the Garden (1964) is very much 
a product of its time. It also looks presciently towards great changes in our 
thinking about ecology and technology. As Marx suggests in his American 
Studies classic, the effects of industrial transformation on nineteenth-cen-
tury literature and society were not adequately understood in his own day. 
The nineteenth century, as Marx saw it, heralded something entirely unique 
in the history of our relation to technology and nature, and more generally 
speaking, in our “larger structure of thought” (24). Thus Marx refers to 
the “new order” of industrial technology, marked off from pre-industrial 
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tech, as “a centrifugal force that threatens to break down, once and for all, 
the conventional contrast between ... two styles of life” (32)—the urban-
technological and the rural agrarian.
Marx’s well-known narrative is about the encroachment of technology, 
the agent of historical change, into the realm of what he calls “American 
pastoralism” (4). This is a complex concept in Marx’s book, though what is 
most important for us to recognize right away is the liberal humanist pre-
suppositions that motivate it. Marx’s American pastoralism is inspired by 
a desire to safeguard principles of free will and self-determination against 
statist threats feared by both the mainstream and the rising counter-culture 
of the 1960s. Such safeguarding was an admirable project in the liberal 
frame of mind, though it was founded upon a number of social exclusions 
and conceptual blindspots. In his essay “Dis-assembling The Machine in 
the Garden: Antihumanism and the Critique of American Studies” (1992), 
Jeffrey Louis Decker insists on the importance of interrogating these exclu-
sions and blindspots in Marx’s work, and in the work of canonical Ameri-
can Studies scholars of the 1950s and 1960s more generally. In my essay 
I want to suggest that, in the notable case of The Machine in the Garden, 
there is a considerable amount of self-dis-assembly, or critical deconstruc-
tion of “unmarked” humanism, going on already, via American pastoralism.
In part, American pastoralism refers to the cultural record of fears and 
anxieties for the future of traditional agrarian existence; in part it refers to 
the romantic possibility of spiritual transcendence through Nature.  In its 
turn, this notion relies on an old-fashioned Cartesianism of mind and body, 
or mind and material history.1 Yet, as I shall argue, what makes Marx’s book 
of enduring interest is the ideological stress he puts on his pastoral idea via 
a thinking of “originary technicity,” such that we find signposts in The Ma-
chine in the Garden pointing to a post-pastoral, post-Cartesian world scat-
tered through its pages. On Marx’s account, the new, nineteenth-century 
order of industrial technology could not be sufficiently contained. Its viral 
invasion of self, mind, and “pure consciousness” constituted an assault on 
the conceptual borders that help to define both liberal humanism, and pas-
toralism as a kind of prophylactic practice. Its threat was not just virtual, as 
Marx’s own rhetoric might lead us to believe; for what we witness in The 
1 See Bruce Kulkick’s seminal essay “Myth and Symbol in American Studies” (1972) for an early and influ-
ential articulation of this line of criticism. Decker’s “Dis-assembling,” published twenty years later, owes 
considerable debt to Kulkick, though it is also critically transformed through its poststructuralist inputs.   
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Machine in the Garden is a post-pastoral world in the making, where the 
distinction between techno-culture and nature, mind and machine, starts 
disappearing.2   
The approach to The Machine in the Garden I offer here responds to the 
criticism that the book is wrongly understood as a milestone in technol-
ogy studies and ecological studies, because it insufficiently treats the mate-
rial history of nineteenth-century industrial technology. Jeffrey L. Meikle 
investigates the history of this critique in his “Classics Revisited” review 
of The Machine in the Garden, following the 35th anniversary edition re-
publication of the book in 1999. “If The Machine in the Garden is indeed 
distinguished by the near absence of any discussion of actual technologies,” 
Meikle surmises, “then it makes sense to ask why many ... think of the book 
as a significant event in the formation of the history of technology as an 
academic discipline” (147). Critics writing well before Meikle have made 
similar claims. As John L. Bryant notes in his essay “A Usable Pastoralism” 
(1975), Marx “is often hard pressed to find any machines, much less de-
rive a convincing interpretation of their function” (66). For his part, Meikle 
locates in Marx’s work a typically humanities-inflected resistance to writ-
ing about technology, which, as Meikle explains, was shared by “a broad 
spectrum of scholars and teachers of American studies, especially those of 
the author’s own generation who shared his anxiety about a postnuclear 
world dominated by the technological systems of what became known as 
the military-industrial complex” (156-157).
Marx couldn’t face history, so this argument goes, because like his fel-
low cultural critics he was fearful of asking too many questions about the 
technological-cultural conditions that prevailed in his own day. Certainly 
those authors to whom Meikle refers, both Marx and other American Stud-
ies standard bearers, revealed little sense of political responsibility to con-
front the military-industrial complex in the years leading up to the Vietnam 
War; and while I do not dispute that real fears about facing down history, 
2 This problem of relation is central to Marx’s study, both thematically and structurally. The machines of in-
dustrial technology are not of the same order as the “garden” of “American pastoralism.” Machines index a 
material history, whereas American pastoralism is an intellectual and philosophical ideal. More specifical-
ly, Marx’s American pastoralism is a heuristic device through which the significance of nineteenth-century 
industrial technology is revalued in light of mid-twentieth-century historical realities and literary-critical 
exigencies.
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or owning up to the present, existed amongst these authors, I will claim 
that they responded to it in different ways, and that Marx attempts to ac-
complish something quite different from that of his contemporaries, even if 
there are also crucial similarities connecting his work and theirs.
First to a key similarity: The Machine in the Garden is essentially about 
how early Americans tried but failed to realize the pastoral ideal in col-
lective practices, and then how that ideal was internalized within the con-
sciousness of literary artists. Living “the American experience” is thus 
taken by Marx—along with other prominent American Studies scholars 
of the 1950s and 1960s such as R.W.B. Lewis, Charles Feidelson, Richard 
Chase, and Richard Poirier—as an adventure in imaginative perception. 
What counted most for these “liberal consensus” literary critics was the 
piercing life of the mind, shielded from the uncertainties of an increasingly 
technologically driven history. This was a crucial aspect of their ideologi-
cal system, what Donald Pease refers to as the “fundamental syntax” of 
their exceptionalist and essentialist “field-Imaginary” (11); and it broadly 
draws together the main works of all the mid-century scholars mentioned 
above.  
However, there is an important distinction between The Machine in the 
Garden and those other field-defining American Studies classics, such as 
Chase’s The American Novel and Its Tradition, Lewis’ The American Adam, 
Feidelson’s Symbolism in American Literature, and Poirier’s A World Else-
where. Marx’s book confronts the material-historical forces that liberal 
consensus criticism was mainly designed to deflect, even if, as Meikle and 
Bryant both note, it has less to say about technology than its title would 
suggest. Marx does indeed write about Hawthorne’s limekilns and Mel-
ville’s tryworks, to strategically note two dominant examples of techno-
logical representation in his book; however, as Meikle puts it, “he shifted 
those nebulous ‘machines’ to the periphery” (150) in between publication 
of his original foray into his theme, the 1956 New England Quarterly essay 
“The Machine in the Garden”, and the book publication eight years later. 
In the book, Marx would reorient his study more firmly in the direction of 
literary critique. He would focus “on a series of dramatic intrusions in the 
landscape of the American garden,” part metaphorical and part literal: “the 
shriek of a steam locomotive interrupting Hawthorne’s contemplation of 
nature on a drowsy summer day in Sleepy Hollow; a steamboat looming 
monstrously out of the dark to smash the idyllic Mississippi raft of Huck 
Finn ...” (Meikle 150).
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In other words, Marx would repeat in 1964 what American Studies 
scholars had already been doing for years: first, he would favor a privileged 
group of white, male canonical writers for his literary subjects; and second, 
he would refract technological history through the lens of metaphor, myth, 
and symbol, thus in effect depoliticizing that history. It is in such a manner 
that Marx has stood accused over the decades; and for various reasons his 
transgressions often ended up functioning as a lightning rod for criticism 
of American Studies practices more broadly—first by the early revisionists 
(such as Bryant), and later by the “New Americanists” (such as Decker 
and Meikle). With regard to the first charge, it is surely very difficult to 
dismiss the gendered and racially-biased elitism of his approach, as well as 
that of his contemporaries. By the lights of the cultural-critical perspective 
that has predominated in the humanities for much of the last half century, 
Marx’s European male-writer focus constitutes at the very least a failure of 
imagination, curiosity, and empathy. But what about the second charge of 
the hypostatization of consciousness, the refraction of technological his-
tory through the myth of the cognitivized pastoral? Here I believe that the 
“crime” is mitigated by certain circumstances, or overlooked aspects of 
Marx’s work which are perhaps easier for us to appreciate in the 21st cen-
tury, thanks to changing technological conditions and the changing quali-
ties of the critical discourses we use to speak about “nature,” “technology,” 
and “the human.”
As Meikle observes, Marx would “deftly [trace] the development of an 
ideology of technological progress” (151) that grew out of the materially 
exploitable distinction between technology and nature. He would do some-
thing else too: he would put in question the nature/culture dualism that 
grounds this progress ideology. The clue is in the preposition in the title—
The Machine in the Garden—which both assumes the distinction between 
nature and culture, and advances another kind of thinking of their relation 
altogether.
I want to suggest Marx’s debt to a style of thinking about technology 
which cuts against the grain of the liberal or socialist humanism and liberal 
progressive ideology which irrefutably informs his writing.  This style of 
thinking, associated with the word technicity, underscores the intimacy of 
our insinuation with technology, and in so doing problematizes our notion 
of the relationships between techne, nature, and whatever it is that we are 
in virtue of being, at least in part, some undecidable form of their synthesis. 
Whereas classical philosophy of technology insists upon the distinction be-
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tween homo faber and his tools, theories of originary technicity, as Arthur 
Bradley explains, constitute “a machine for revealing that technology is 
always already contaminating phusis, anamnēsis, consciousness, ipseity, or 
the living more generally” (14).
The concept of originary technicity, associated with philosophers from 
Marx to Heidegger to Gilbert Simondon to Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, 
encourages us to see ourselves as ontologically connected with technology.3 
All we need to do is think about the guiding metaphors since the rise of 
modern science for defining the human—the human as a clock, as a motor, 
as an information machine—and then recognize that the persistence of such 
historically determinate metaphors speaks to a profound need to understand 
human-ness through technological means. Originary technicity, then, in-
sists that technology is a crucial aspect of our human nature—it encourages 
us to see that nature as inseparable from our technological condition. It is in 
this sense that the machine and the garden are confounded in Marx’s book: 
they inform each other in deep down ways in spite of how we normally 
think about their relation. Marx thus undermines the notion of their radical 
difference, and this has consequences for our picture of U.S. literary/critical 
history, as well as for ecological theory and technology studies.
For the sake of getting a bead on this alternative thinking about technol-
ogy in The Machine in the Garden, I want to begin with a brief passage of 
nineteenth-century science journalism that Marx discusses roughly halfway 
through the book:
In the period between 1830 and 1860 popular discussions of technological progress as-
sume that inventors are uncovering the ultimate structural principles of the universe.  In 
1850 a writer inspired by a new telescope says: “How wonderful the process by which 
the human brain, in its casket of bone, can alone establish such remote and transcendental 
3 In his Technics and Time, Vol.1: The Fault of Epimetheus, Bernard Steigler articulates the evolutionary 
argument for the technological-natural-human synthesis that informs the idea of originary technicity.  As 
Steigler writes: “From the Zinjanthropian to the Neanderthal, cortex and tools are differentiated together, 
in one and the same movement.  It is a question of a singular process of structural coupling in ‘exterioriza-
tion,’ an instrumental maieutics, a ‘mirror proto-stage’ in which the differentiation of the cortex is deter-
mined by the tool as much as that of the tool by the cortex, a mirror effect in which one, informing itself 
of the other, is both seen and deformed in the process, and is thus transformed” (176).  In such a manner, 
the process of corticalization is bound up tightly with the evolution of knapped flint.  The question of the 
“who” and the “what” in human evolution and human history are inseparable.  This observation finds its 
various echoes in Karl Marx’s description of the labor process in Chapter 7 of Capital, in Heidegger’s “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” and in Derrida’s career-long elaboration of the deconstructive figures 
of différance, trace, and supplement. 
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truths.”  The overblown, exclamatory tone of so much of this writing arises from an in-
toxicated feeling of unlimited possibility.  History has a meaning, a purpose, and a reach-
able goal: it is nothing less than man’s acquisition of the absolute truth.  (198)
In his framing commentary, Marx highlights the extravagant quality of this 
brief encomium, inspired by a telescope; and which, as his study reinforces, 
was so routine in the treatment of technological development in the nine-
teenth century: this glib self-satisfaction in European-American technical 
ingenuity. Yet for us, what is most striking about the language is not its 
tedious conviction that the secrets of the universe are revealed through sci-
ence. Rather, it is its rhetorical incisiveness, in how it seals off the human 
brain, “in its casket of bone,” from the technology with which it is inti-
mately involved.
The real lesson here is in how readily nineteenth-century observers were 
able to separate out cognition and the record of technological advance from 
the existence of technological artifacts themselves. What the science jour-
nalist writing in 1850 does not see is how human cognition, perception, and 
technology form an integral unit, or an historical assemblage. This is the 
lesson of both originary technicity and historical materialism, as first pro-
pounded by another Marx, Karl Marx, whose writings were on the whole 
religiously ignored by the American Studies critics.  Marx’s work has of 
course exerted significant influence on the development of poststructural-
ism and related theoretical perspectives in the humanities since the 1970s. 
From the materialist point of view informing contemporary ecological 
theory, technology refers less to an instrumental reason and more to an 
ontological state.  
Those properties that we readily identify with the human condition as 
such—agency, mind, consciousness, thinking—are shown from the mate-
rialist perspective which philosophers of originary technicity assume as in-
extricably bound up with quasi-mechanical technical processes. From this 
perspective, as promoted by philosophers of technics, our technology is not 
supplemental but rather essential to our humanity. There is no transcen-
dence, but there is this connecting that Leo Marx gestures towards in the 
commentary above, such that the brain, the hand, and the ground and pol-
ished glass of the telescope lens form an irreducible whole. This notion may 
have been anathema to the variety of intellectual history that Marx more 
popularly practiced, but our present interest in Marx’s book stems from the 
fact that it is there anyway. 
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Another way of putting my argument is that The Machine in the Gar-
den queries the liberal consensus critical heritage from which it emerges. 
The book’s key themes and conflicts short-circuit the mission to promote 
the liberal individualist illusion of escape from the shaping forces of his-
tory. This was a mission to promote the concept of a “world elsewhere,” 
to recall the critic Richard Poirier’s rebranding of the liberal consensus 
mythos. According to Poirier, this world elsewhere, this other place, con-
jured in and through the creative language of literary artists, is the space 
of the romantic self’s natural freedom from history and necessity. A World 
Elsewhere was published two years after The Machine in the Garden, in 
1966, as if to neutralize the obscure threat to the consensus critical es-
tablishment that Marx’s quietly unsettling work constituted. For what we 
begin to glean in The Machine in the Garden is that there is no elsewhere, 
no place for a transcendence that guarantees the “naturalness” of nature, or 
the romantic integrity of the self. There is only the world—an ever increas-
ingly technologically mediated world—which on the one hand creates the 
very means for our access to nature, and on the other hand, dispels the 
very ‘Nature’ it reveals through an inevitable process of contamination. 
Nature and technology are entwined in the most compelling of Marx’s 
analyses, through a critical emphasis on what we might call technical, or 
technicized, perception.  
Let us consider Marx writing on Melville’s Moby Dick, an essential lit-
erary touchstone in The Machine in the Garden. Marx notes how Melville 
“pursues the analogy between human and natural productivity” in Moby 
Dick (311), in a scene where Ishmael remembers a curious adventure from 
years past, amongst Polynesian islanders, and which curiously takes place 
inside the skeleton of a sperm whale. As Ishmael recounts, a giant whale 
skeleton had been ritually transformed by a tribe of islanders into some-
thing like a lush green temple: “It was a wondrous sight,” Ishmael remem-
bers. “The wood was green as mosses of the Icy Glen; the trees stood high 
and haughty, feeling their living sap; the industrious earth beneath was as 
a weaver’s loom, with a gorgeous carpet on it, whereof the ground vine 
tendrils formed the warp and woof ...” (Melville, quoted on p. 311). “The 
bones of the skeleton are criss-crossed with vines,” Marx observes of the 
scene, “and through them the sunlight seems ‘a flying shuttle weaving the 
unwearied verdue.’” Suddenly Ishmael is reminded of a textile factory. As 
Marx writes of Ishmael’s jarring conceit:
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Here, growing in the whale’s skeleton, is the greenness Ishmael has been seeking, yet 
that same greenness has the aspect of a factory. It is a bold conceit, this green factory 
inside the whale—another vivid metaphor of American experience: Ishmael deliberately 
making his way to the center of primal nature only to find, when he arrives, a premoni-
tory sign of industrial power. Art and nature are inextricably tangled at the center. (312)
Indeed, for Marx, Moby Dick is centrally about the recognition of this en-
tanglement.  In the preceding passage, “primal nature,” strangely bodied 
forth in a whale skeleton, is thoroughly hybridized: it is fused from the 
bones up, so to speak, with the mechanical and the machinic. It is in such 
a manner that Melville’s novel serves as an important case study for the 
greater, and partially ideologically obscured, historical materialist argu-
ment of The Machine in the Garden.
For the sake of exemplifying the contrast between Marx and his contem-
poraries, I shall turn to R. W. B. Lewis’s treatment of Moby Dick in The 
American Adam (1955). Lewis highlights another scene from Moby Dick, 
the incident of “The Try-Works,” to make his case for Melville’s ironic 
transcendence of the foundational struggle between what Lewis famously 
identifies as the competing Parties of Hope and Memory in U.S. literature. 
These Parties roughly correspond in The American Adam to the opposing 
attitudes towards the myth of the “new man” in nineteenth-century Ameri-
can letters, the “new hero” who emancipates himself from history in the 
manner mythologized in certain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liter-
ary traditions, and condoned in the mainstream liberal consensus criticism 
of the mid-twentieth century. For Lewis, the subject of “The Try-Works” 
chapter is “the different degrees of moral alertness” (132) corresponding 
to the different ways of confronting the cultural conflict between hope and 
memory, or “innocence” and history, in nineteenth-century U.S. literature.
In this often-discussed chapter from Melville’s novel, Ishmael falls 
asleep at the tiller one black, moonless night. He wakes up with a start, not 
recognizing he has slept at all. He has inadvertently turned himself around, 
back to the prow, and finds himself gazing perplexedly into the fiery furnace 
of the “try-pots” amidships, where the harpooners work the whale blubber 
and extract the oil. Thinking that the ghastly, fiery activity on the boat is 
really out there in the Java seas, menacing the ship from beyond, Ishmael 
nearly capsizes the Pequod, readying to turn it violently away from imag-
ined danger. “The moral follows” (131), Lewis writes, quoting the hopeful 
and buoyant lines of Ishmael in his commentary on the event: 
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Look not too long in the face of fire, O man! ... believe not the artificial fire, when its 
redness makes all things look ghastly. Tomorrow, in the natural sun, the skies will be 
bright; those who glared like devils in the forking flames, the morn will show in far other, 
at least gentler relief; the glorious, golden, glad sun, the only true lamp—all others but 
liars.  (Melville, quoted on p. 131)
    
What is striking here is how nature and technology—“glad sun” and “artifi-
cial fire”—function as analogues for those opposite poles in between which 
are situated the differing degrees of moral alertness pertaining to Lewis’s 
competing Parties of Hope and Memory. At the poles, the empty innocence 
of Nature/Hope faces off against the baleful artifice of Technology/His-
tory. In Ishmael’s sermonizing, as Lewis highlights, technology is associ-
ated with “a sense of evil so inflexible ... that it is perilously close to a love 
of evil, a queer pact with the devil” (Lewis 132). For Ishmael, at least here 
in the “Try-Works” chapter, the fire of technology, born of human artifice, 
provides a dangerous light from which to see one’s self in the world. If we 
orient ourselves in the world by this evil and false light, we are doomed. If 
we wait for the golden light of the one, true, god-like sun, the “natural” light 
from which to judge the morality of our actions and the righteousness of our 
behavior, then we will find our salvation.
In The American Adam, Lewis sanctions the nature/technology dualism 
that Ishmael seizes upon in a homiletic mood, and uses it to forward his 
own argument about the field of U.S. literature’s troubled relation per se 
to history, memory, and the technology of the archive. This seductive argu-
ment of tragically lost innocence would help to secure the fortunes of the 
American Studies movement in the 1950s, and would also help to sustain it 
through the whole of a bitter postwar period in which the U.S. would keep 
losing its innocence over and over again. Lewis certainly does not promote 
the reality of American innocence, but he does promote the myth. He argues 
for its embeddedness in the cultural DNA of America; and so, according 
to the argument of The American Adam, America’s trouble with history is 
destined to persist, in no small part through the double alienation from both 
technology and nature that is attendant upon this failed quest for illusory 
innocence.
As Marx argues in a different spirit from Lewis: “In a whaling world, 
Ishmael discovers, man’s primary relation to nature is technological” 
(295, italics added).  This discovery has nothing to do with alienation, 
and everything to do with connection, and recognition of the elemental 
relationships that exist between humans, the natural world, and techno-
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logical means. Marx turns to Chapter 60 of Moby Dick, “The Line,” in 
order to illustrate “the astonishing range of insight released by Melville’s 
whaling trope” (295). In this chapter, Melville’s profoundly materially-
oriented narrative zooms in on the whale-line. The whale line fastens the 
harpoon that pierces the whale’s blubber to the ship-board systems which 
will carve up the whale’s body and extract its exploitable resources. In 
other words, the whale line connects the “natural,” living body of the 
whale to the technology of the whaling ship for the sake of commercial 
culture. Marx suggests that “The Line” is insignificant in terms of the 
“action” of the novel, but this is only half right because so much of the 
action of Moby Dick concerns mental recalibrations of these elemental 
relations between culture, nature, and the human.  If the line is “magi-
cal, sometimes horrible” (384), as Melville writes and Marx approvingly 
quotes, it is because of the strange connective properties which Melville 
attributes to it.
Melville’s description of the line, according to Marx, discloses the el-
emental aspect of physical dependence, plunder, and exploit that underlies 
the deceptively mild, abstract quality of life in our technical civilization. 
Here the simple Manila rope is made to seem an archetype of the physical 
bond between man and nature, whether industrial or primitive. Although 
whaling is a rationalized, collective operation, based on a strict division of 
labor, it remains a bloody, murderous hunt. Playing this fact against the illu-
sion that civilized man has won his freedom from physical nature, Melville 
transforms the line into an emblem of our animal fate (295-296).
If technology is supposed to help us achieve transcendence, as the jour-
nalist writing about the telescope assumes, Marx stresses how the lessons 
of Moby Dick teach us otherwise. Technology is intimately bound together 
with nature, and the human is the product of their inextricable connected-
ness. Ishmael discovers on board the Pequod that “man’s primary rela-
tion to nature is technological.” Our very capacity to know, Marx insists 
with a suddenly unguarded materialist conviction in his close reading of 
“The Line,” is evidence that the eminently ‘natural’ process of thinking 
itself possesses a technical dimension, and that it is, invariably, histori-
cally conditioned. If it is so on board the Pequod, where Ishmael comes to 
realize the moral and social consequences of this technological relation to 
nature, it is so in the wider world too. Such knowledge, as Marx fatefully 
recognizes, must redound on Nature itself, getting us back to his prefatory 
comments about changes in our “larger structure of thought,” and about 
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the “centrifugal force” of industrial technology in breaking down the very 
distinction between pastoral and the urban-technological, or nature and 
history.  
The critical project that Marx maps out in The Machine in the Garden is 
guided by a sense of momentous change in thinking about the relation be-
tween nature and technology. However, this does not mean that his book is 
completely unmarked by the same conventional thinking about the nature/
culture dualism that characterized the more mainstream, liberal consensus-
inspired American Studies scholarship of the day. If in its most prescient 
moments Marx’s criticism gestures toward the dissolution of the nature/
culture divide, elsewhere it helps to consolidate it. In other words, The Ma-
chine in the Garden goes both ways. I shall here turn to Marx’s commentary 
on Emerson, on the poet’s duty to aestheticize the railroads, mills, and fac-
tories that were transforming the New England countryside from the 1830s 
on. Only through such aestheticization, or such working-over of human 
artifice into a more fundamental, and natural, unity of experience, Marx 
suggests, could ugly, dirty factories and such be integrated into a greater 
Whole, a “natural” Order. Emerson’s position, Marx writes, “is like the 
one Shakespeare had assigned to Polixenes in the pastoral episode of The 
Winter’s Tale” (242).
If there is conflict between techne, or art, and nature, this must be rec-
oncilable, because, as Polixenes explains in a passage that has spawned 
considerable critical debate over the centuries: “Nature is made better by no 
mean/But Nature makes that mean; so over that art/ Which you say adds to 
Nature, is an art/That Nature makes.” Marx reads these lines at face value: 
Emerson-as-Polixenes sees nature as preceding technology, or artifice. Na-
ture comes first—it has ontological primacy—and technology comes sec-
ond, for it is subsumed by Nature and therefore rates only as a “second 
nature.” Yet in fact, Polixenes’ lines are shot through with dramatic irony. 
The real lesson of this speech in The Winter’s Tale is that Polixenes fails 
to extend his conviction in the “naturalness” of cross-breeding in plants 
to the world of human beings. Polixenes’ distinction itself is strategic ar-
tifice, for he cannot abide the idea of his noble son Florizel marrying, and 
“cross-breeding,” with Perdita, the princess whom he falsely believes to be 
low-born.
My point is that Marx’s own failure to acknowledge Shakespeare’s irony 
in his commentary on Emerson is a telling indication of the institutional 
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collusion between the liberal consensus ideology to which he submits here, 
and a certain style of romantic idealism to which Emerson was obviously 
prone. Marx couldn’t get entirely away from that. Unlike Coleridge, who 
argued that Polixenes’ lines ironically establish the primacy of artifice over 
nature; or unlike Karl Marx, who insisted that man is the creation of his 
own labor, Leo Marx’s liberal consensus conditioning shows in his occa-
sional dedication to the idea of a human imagination beyond techne and 
history. In some ways, this is precisely what makes The Machine in the 
Garden so strangely compelling a book to this day, this vacillation between 
a critical and philosophical materialism and a more culturally, or at least 
institutionally, predominant idealism. And yet, through this vacillation a 
boundary is repeatedly crossed, such that we end up finding the historical 
machine, in the figure of technical perception, very much embedded in the 
liberal-humanist garden of ascetic contemplation, such that Marx’s book 
arguably ends up accommodating itself to a Marxian world view, in spite of 
its liberal consensus affiliation.
Perhaps another way of stating this is that in his dual allegiances to tech-
nics and romantic idealism, Marx essentially stages the difficulty of putting 
the machine in the garden.  But it is there, and this is why Marx remains 
relevant. With its built-in escape hatch to a wished for realm of pure literary 
imagination, Poirier’s A World Elsewhere is a much more institutionally 
constrained product of American Studies scholarship in the years imme-
diately preceding the rise of poststructuralism and the New Americanist 
assault on the mid-century American Studies movement—the increasing 
sophistication of which is traceable from John L. Bryant’s attention to “the 
pitfalls of the dialectical method” (68) in The Machine in the Garden, to 
Jeffrey Louis Decker’s project “to disassemble the critical machine within 
the Americanist’s garden in order to denaturalize the uncritical promotion 
of a ‘humanistic understanding of American culture’” (282). If Marx’s book 
has generated far more critical attention, and general interest, over the years 
than most other American Studies classics, it is due to the creative potential 
of this inherent tension; it is due to the way in which it opens itself to the 
future by not being entirely certain about how to articulate the relationship 
between human beings, technology, and the natural world; aside from the 
insistence that they occupy the same world because there is no elsewhere.
In its ambiguities, Marx’s book has helped to establish a new tradition. It 
ushered in a new era of ethical/ecological engagement in literary and cultural 
scholarship. Marx himself defends his book against the New Americanist 
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claims of its “allegedly ‘holistic,’ universalizing tendency” (Afterword 493) 
mainly on the basis of its participation in the environmental politics of the 
1960s. If, as he insists, he regrets his failure to have taken up “the history and 
the expressive life ... of women, ethnic and racial minorities, gays, and mem-
bers of the working class” (492), he nevertheless refutes the broader charge 
of his book’s political quietism. As he writes in 1999, in the wake of the New 
Americanist revisionism and the multicultural turn in cultural studies:
True, the divisions in American society and culture highlighted by the earlier generation 
of scholars were not those on which today’s multiculturalist scholars chose to focus. 
Nevertheless, The Machine in the Garden emphasizes a fundamental divide in American 
culture and society.  It separates the popular affirmation of industrial progress dissemi-
nated by spokesmen for the dominant economic and political elites, and the disaffected, 
often adversarial viewpoint of a minority of political radicals, writers, artists, clergymen, 
and independent intellectuals.  (Afterword 493)  
Had Marx included the voices of writers beyond the narrow literary canon 
of mid-century, his study would have been richer, and perhaps of still great-
er contemporary interest. Yet its achievement is significant in spite of these 
shortcomings. Indeed, The Machine in the Garden seems all the more rele-
vant in the light of more recent critical and theoretical developments. If not 
exactly participating in it, The Machine in the Garden gestures towards the 
politics of the posthuman. Marx’s book certainly shares a defining trait of 
posthumanism, which as Jussi Parikka puts it, is a “lack of certainty of what 
constitutes the human brought about by scientific, technological, and eco-
logical forces” (63). I quote the media studies theorist Parikka here because 
his critical and theoretical project across a number of books resonates with 
Marx’s, at least in terms of this insistence on the hybridization of nature/
technology.4 As Parikka writes of this project in Geology of Media (2015), 
he does “not engage with an Aesthetization of Nature that might separate 
humans from their environment ... but with the opposite: to establish prox-
imity, map the links, the continuum of medianatures where the natural ecol-
ogy is entirely entangled with the technological one” (63). Marx helped to 
establish this proximity, entangling nature and culture through an incipient 
thinking of technicity in and for U.S. literary studies.
4 See also Parikka’s Digital Contagions: A Media Archaeology of Computer Viruses (New York: Peter Lang, 
2007) and Insect Media: An Archaeology of Animals and Technology (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2010).
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As Marx intuitively understood, there is great danger in seeing ourselves 
as ontologically alienated from either nature or technology. Hence his 
thinking about ecology is itself ecological. Here too, I see Marx as nudg-
ing at an early point toward a developing posthuman understanding of the 
relations between nature, technology, and ourselves. If Marx’s writing reso-
nates with Parikka’s, it resonates too with Timothy Morton’s. In such books 
as Ecology Without Nature (2009), The Ecological Thought (2010), and 
Hyperobjects (2013), Morton argues that we have to move beyond the idea 
of nature as outside of civilization, as “a thing of some other kind” (ET 3). 
But making that leap, in order to see Nature as a product of historically 
conditioned thought, also entails moving beyond the idea of the human as 
outside of technology.
We recall Marx on Melville: man’s relation to nature is technological. 
By the same token, as promoted by so much poststructuralist and posthu-
manist-inspired thought, our relation to technology is natural: our nature is 
technological. As Morton writes, “[t]he ghost of ‘Nature,’ a brand new enti-
ty dressed up like a relic from a past age, haunted the modernity in which it 
was born” (ET 5). This is precisely what concerned Marx, that this modern 
and romantic haunting by an alienated (and alienating) Nature was actually 
a dangerous symptom of the onset of technological modernity.
The modern Western alienation from Nature was a function of the alien-
ation from technology, and this was simply another way of referring to an 
abdication of responsibility, of not owning up to the fact that our “alien-
ation” was convenient for some, like owners of industrial capital, and dam-
aging for many more. It suggested that forces were at play over which hu-
mans had no meaningful influence. In the long run our “alienation” has led 
us to the brink of ecological catastrophe.  Certainly Marx saw through the 
delusions of tragic and alienated innocence better than most mid-twentieth-
century U.S. cultural critics.
Meanwhile, the old obsession with nature versus technology or nature 
versus culture that Marx himself grappled with is still “the cognitive dis-
sonance of our time,” as the architectural theorist David Ruy writes in a 
recent Syracuse University course prospectus titled “The Garden in the Ma-
chine.” This is a neat bit of riffing on Marx’s book title which, trolling the 
web further, one discovers, has a certain persistence in academic publish-
ing, as well as in the annals of urban planning and architectural practice. 
There is, for example, Claus Emmeche’s book The Garden in the Machine: 
The Emerging Science of Artificial Life (1996); and Scott MacDonald’s The 
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Garden in the Machine: A Field Guide to Independent Films About Place 
(2001); and there is the architectural firm Studio Gang’s 2012 project pro-
posal to revitalize Chicago’s run-down Cicero neighborhood by creatively 
recombining foreclosed factory and housing spaces; the high-profile project 
being named  ... “The Garden in the Machine.”5 All of these examples use 
the punning Marx reference as a point of departure for addressing in one 
way or another the continuing cognitive dissonance regarding nature and 
culture that Ruy remarks on, and that the literary critic and environmental 
theorist Frederick Turner takes up too, with considerable bile, in his essay 
“Cultivating the American Garden:”
This ideological opposition of culture and nature—with no mediating term—has had real 
consequences.  More often than need be, Americans confronted with a natural landscape 
have either exploited it or designated it a wilderness area.  The polluter and the ecology 
freak are two faces of the same coin; they both perpetuate a theory about nature that al-
lows no alternative to raping it or tying it up in a plastic bag to protect it from contamina-
tion.  (45) 
  
And yet the reversal in terms of what is in and what is out certainly points 
to some kind of mutation in the “nature” of our cognitive dissonance.  More 
than half a century after Marx’s book publication, we live in a world of far 
more porous borders between techno-culture and nature. The blurring line 
is indisputable: think of bio-engineering, genomics, cybernetics, and nano-
tech. Think of how our immersive technical systems are themselves begin-
ning to assume “natural” qualities, as in “digital ecosystems” and “cloud 
computing.” David Ruy writes in “The Garden in the Machine,” “[today] 
[w]e are seeing the distinction between the natural and the artificial be-
coming difficult—perhaps even unnecessary.” Marx would not, and could 
not, have put it the same way in 1964. We may indeed still routinely think 
unreflectively in terms of this nature/culture binary, but we are also more 
capable today of stopping ourselves, looking around the world, and think-
ing beyond it.  My conviction is that Leo Marx helped us to get there. 
5 See “Foreclosed: Rehousing the American Dream.” http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2012/
foreclosed/cicero.  Accessed Jan. 29, 2016.  
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